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This paper examines, within a dynamic framework, the role of information provision 
as a policy instrument to supplement environmental taxation. Several products are 
responsible for long term health problems as well as environmental damages. Many 
consumers do not possess the required information to optimally substitute away from 
these products. However, as the stock of information regarding the negative effects of 
these products builds up, an increasing fraction of consumers behaves optimally. The 
government uses two policy instruments, environmental taxation and information 
provision. We show that as the accumulated stock of information increases, the 
optimal tax rate declines over time. Information provision can shift market demand 
towards environmentally friendly goods over time, and thus reduce the required level 
of the tax rate. Our results provide strong evidence in support of information 
campaigns as a policy instrument to supplement traditional environmental policies. 
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 1 Introduction
Balancing human needs with the health of consumers and the natural en-
vironment may be the most pressing global concern of the twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury. Consumers are becoming more and more concerned about products
containing substances that are toxic, carcinogenic or in general harmful to
them in their everyday use and at the same time dangerous to the envi-
ronment. Many products, including food, electric and electronic products,
tools and toys have been proven to generate long term health problems to
their users as well as environmental damages. Individuals have incentives
to reduce the consumption of such products by choosing, if available, less
harmful substitutes. However, consumers are bewildered by - and often very
skeptical about - the many health and environmental claims made by man-
ufacturers and retailers for their products. Although consumer associations
and environmental groups could play a role in bridging the information gap,
their eﬀectiveness, in most cases, is limited. Thus, there is a clear need
for government intervention to resolve the information asymmetry, which
over the years has taken diﬀerent forms, including taxation and provision of
information.
The present paper examines the role that information provided by the
government to consumers could play in supplementing environmental taxa-
tion, and speciﬁcally the question of choosing the optimal mix of taxation
and information provision. We use a dynamic framework in order to be able
to take into account the lengthy process through which information aﬀects
consumers’ habits and attitudes.
In particular we examine the case of a diﬀerentiated product oﬀered in
two types, produced by two ﬁrms competing in prices. During its lifetime
this product generates environmental externalities (external damages) and
at the same time imposes damages on each individual user (individual dam-
ages). The magnitude of both types of damages depends on the product
type. We normalize by assuming that one type of the product does not
generate damages (clean good), while the other type of the product (dirty
good), generates both types of damages. We assume that consumers take
2into account individual damages if they have correct information. However,
consumers’ knowledge (perception) of individual damages is imperfect. For
simplicity, we assume that there are two groups of consumers, those that
have perfect knowledge of the individual damages and those that do not.
Informed consumers always hold true beliefs and, for given prices, substi-
tute away from the dirty and towards the clean good.
Within this framework the government imposes at each time period a tax
τ(t) and provides a ﬂow of information a(t). We assume that consumers’ be-
havior at each time period depends on the accumulated stock of information
A(t), rather than on currently provided information. More speciﬁcally, we
assume that the stock of accumulated information A(t) inﬂuences the com-
position of the two groups of consumers. The higher the stock of information
is, the higher is the fraction of consumers that become informed. However,
the stock of information depreciates over time. Following the mainstream of
the advertising literature we assume that consumers’ response to the stock
of information is S-shaped. At the initial stages of the information provision
campaign, consumers are more responsive to the information they receive,
while as the campaign develops consumers’ responsiveness slows down.
The main policy result of our analysis is that the optimal tax rate declines
over time as the accumulated stock of information increases. Therefore, if
the government invests in shifting consumption habits and attitudes through
improving information, there is no need to regulate as strictly as before.
Taxation alone does not have long-lasting eﬀects; the same tax level has
t ob ei m p o s e di ne a c ht i m ep e r i o di no r d e rt ob ee ﬀective. Furthermore,
apart from bureaucratic costs, taxation results in eﬃciency losses which are
increasing at the tax level. On the contrary, information provision accumu-
lates over time and does have long-lasting eﬀects. Therefore, our analysis
indicates that there are strong arguments for using information provision to
support environmental taxation.
We derive the optimal paths and the steady states for the two policy
instruments. We show that the optimal level of the stock of information is
higher and the tax rate is lower, the smaller is the rate at which information
depreciates over time and the lower is the cost of information provision. The
3optimal level of the policy instruments depends also on behavioral parame-
ters and the level of individual and external damages. We also show that,
under certain conditions, which include high cost of information provision
a n dh i g hd e p r e c i a t i o nr a t eo fa d v e r t i s e m e n t ,i fw es t a r tw i t hs u ﬃciently low
stock of information, the system could be trapped to zero information pro-
vision. That is, it is optimal for the government to rely only on taxation
and make no eﬀort to inform consumers. In such cases, the system might
exit from the trap only if cost or behavioral parameters change.
In this paper we examine information provision as a public policy in-
strument adopting the view that emphasizes the information disseminating
role of advertisement.1 There is however, another strand of the literature
which asserts that advertisement alters consumers’ tastes, resulting in higher
demand or lower demand elasticity for the advertised product.2 Bagwell
(2007) oﬀers an excellent review of the diﬀerent views of advertising in the
economic literature. Recently, Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) examine the ef-
fects of misleading advertisement by the producers regarding the long term
health consequences of their products and evaluate diﬀerent policy responses
including taxation and advertising by the government. They ﬁnd that, in
an oligopolistic environment, misleading advertisement may increase welfare
by oﬀsetting the market imperfection. On the policy side, if the government
can apply a tax or a ban on misleading advertising, any additional policy
— including government advertising— cannot improve welfare. These policy
recommendations are based on the assumption that the information asym-
metry arises from ﬁrms’ misleading advertising and thus, taxing or banning
advertising is optimal. In the present paper we assume that ﬁrms do not
mislead consumers and asymmetry is due to consumers’ lack of information.
In addition, we assume that the products in question generate environmen-
tal externalities. In such a setting, information provision that supplements
environmental taxation is welfare improving.
The environmental economics literature has examined eco-labeling, certi-
1For example, Nelson (1974), Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979), Kihlstrom and Riordan
(1984) and Stigler (1961) assume that consumers are not fully informed and they receive
complete, costless and instantly validated information through advertisement.
2See for example Galbraith (1958) and Dixit and Norman (1978).
4fying products’ environmental attributes, as a response to fraudulent "green"
advertising by ﬁrms.3 This literature though, does not consider long term
health consequences. There are only a few papers addressing the issue of
government advertising as an environmental policy instrument. Petrakis
et al. (2005) show, within a static framework, that information provision
could dominate, in some cases, environmental taxation in terms of welfare
and that a combination of these two policies is welfare improving. They
also examine the way in which each group of consumers is aﬀected by infor-
mation provision. The present paper diﬀers considerably since it employs a
richer structure of the way in which information provision aﬀects consumers’
behavior and uses a dynamic framework. An earlier study by Kennedy et al.
(1994) also examines environmental information provision. They consider
goods that generate only environmental damages (there are no individual
damages) and consumers cannot with certainty relate these damages to their
utility. Information is provided to consumers at a cost by private ﬁrms. The
informed consumers know the true marginal external damage and take into
account the eﬀect that their own consumption has on their utility. However,
the framework of their analysis diﬀers substantially from the current paper,
which focuses on the role of information provided by the government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents examples
of goods that pose threat to consumers’ health and damages to environment
and examines the various policy responses. Section 3 describes the model,
with Subsection 3.1 presenting the policy options available to the govern-
ment. Section 4 derives the optimal policy mix. Section 5 presents analytical
results in the case of linear demands, constant marginal production costs and
constant marginal external damages. Section 6 illustrates our results using
simulations of the linear model. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Information asymmetry and policy responses
Polyvinyl chloride (PVC), one of the largest-selling plastics in the world,
is a prominent example of products posing both environmental and health
3See for example the recent paper by Hamilton and Zilberman (2006).
5risks. Both of these attributes of PVC, especially its long term health con-
sequences, have been discussed extensively over the past decade. PVC is
widely used in building, packaging, consumer goods (including oﬃce supplies
and toys), electronics industries and even in agriculture. During all phases of
PVC production, as well as during its use and disposal, poisonous chemicals
(dioxins) linked to cancer and birth defects are released. Therefore, PVC
generates environmental damages —such as groundwater contamination and
air pollution— at the same time it poses long term health risks —including
angiosarcoma of the liver, lung cancer, brain cancer, lymphomas, leukemia,
and liver cirrhosis— to its users as well as to certain groups of people such
as workers in the PVC industry and residents in the nearby areas.
Similar problems are encountered with lead used in paints, asbestos used
in buildings and many other elements used in the production of goods. Fur-
thermore, many household goods, including electric and electronic devices,
contain toxic substances harmful to their users at the same time that their
production and disposal generates environmental damages. In the food sec-
tor one could think of fruits and vegetables grown with the use of pes-
ticides, which generate environmental externalities during production and
also health problems to consumers from residues of pesticides.
In response to these problems, governments have implemented a variety
of policies. In some cases governments have used direct policies banning
the use of particular substances in products.4 For example, in response to
PVC’s toxic threats, many governments around the world have passed poli-
cies to ban PVC from use in certain products (with priority given to toys
and food packaging) and switch to safer, healthier alternatives. Some gov-
ernments have also used environmental taxes to provide economic incentives
for reducing the demand for such products. One such example is the Danish
government’s tax on PVCs.
The above examples of policy responses indicate a general transition
of environmental policy from the smokestacks and eﬄuent pipes towards
the process of production and ﬁnally to the consumption patterns, enrich-
4Such an example is the EU Directive on the Restriction on Use
of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) which can be accessed at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0095:EN:HTML.
6ing at the same time, the policy instruments options with market-based
approaches. However, due to the large number of products that generate
health and environmental damages and the complexity of their eﬀects, it is
diﬃcult to address the problems only with direct policies and/or economic
instruments. For example, in the process of switching to PVC-free products,
the provision of information to consumers regarding the health risks of PVC
has been proven extremely important. Information provision is still very im-
portant in countries that have not yet banned these products. Moreover, the
importance of information provision has been established by many studies
in the case of public antismoking campaigns.5
The role of information provision in complementing traditional envi-
ronmental policies has been recognized by Tietenberg and Wheeler (2001).
They oﬀer a number of examples of products and processes that generate
damages to individual consumers and to the environment and they also
review the empirical literature. They conclude that information provision
c a nb ea ne ﬀective policy instrument. Since consumers have incomplete
and inaccurate information regarding the health and environmental eﬀects
of particular products, the government could intervene and provide reliable
information to consumers.
3T h e m o d e l
Consider a product that generates individual and external environmental
damages. The product is oﬀered in two horizontally diﬀerentiated types,
and the magnitude of both individual and external damages diﬀers between
them. For simplicity, we normalize emission units so that the clean type of
the product does not generate any damages, while the dirty type generates
positive individual and external damages. The external damages are given
by D(Qdt),w i t h∂D
∂Q > 0 and ∂2D
∂Q2 ≥ 0,w h e r eQdt is the total quantity of
5For example, Choo and Clark (2006) ﬁnd that information plays an important role
in encouraging particular groups of smokers to quit smoking. Their study is based on
data from an antismoking campaign in the US and Canada in the early 1990s. Farrelly
et al. (2005) using data from an antismoking campaign in the US in early 2000, ﬁnd that
the campaign accounted for a signiﬁc a n tp o r t i o no ft h ed e c l i n ei ny o u t hs m o k i n gi nt h e
period after the campaign. Pierce, Macaskill and Hill (1990) report similar results for an
antismoking campaign in Sydney, Australia in 1983, and in Melbourne in 1984.
7the dirty type of product produced in period t. As regards the individual
damages, we assume that an informed consumer takes into account these
damages in making her consumption choices. The informed consumer de-
rives higher utility from the consumption of the clean relative to the dirty
good, with the parameter θ being a measure of the utility diﬀerential per
unit of product consumed.
At each time period t, the utility of the representative informed consumer
over the two product types is6
U(qc,q d;θ,γ) ,( 1 )
where qj, j = c,d are the quantities consumed of the clean and the dirty
good respectively and γ measures the degree of substitutability between the
two types of the product.7 Thus, we allow for two dimensions of prod-
uct heterogeneity, vertical product diﬀerentiation as reﬂected by individual
damages diﬀerentials8 and horizontal product diﬀerentiation as reﬂected by
individual product type features. We assume that the utility function in
(1) exhibits the standard properties that yield negatively sloped and strictly
convex indiﬀerence curves.
We further assume that initially only a fraction of the consumers are
informed about the dirty good’s long term health eﬀects. For simplicity,
there are two groups of consumers, those with perfect knowledge of the
negative health eﬀects associated with the dirty good and those that have
no knowledge at all. The informed consumers, which form μ fraction of the
population, make their choices based on the correct value of the parameter
θ, while the uninformed consumers behave as if θ was equal to 0.T h u s ,t h e
uninformed consumers are unable to distinguish the two product types in
6We assume that the utility function is linearly separable in the two types of the product
and the other goods. That is, utility is given by U(qc,q d;θ,γ)+I,w h e r eI is the utility
derived from the consumption of other goods. This assumption implies that there are no
income eﬀects and allows us to perform partial equilibrium analysis (see Section 5 for a
particular speciﬁcation of this utility function).
7For instance, in the linear model we employ in Section 5, we assume that the two prod-
ucts are substitutes and thus, γ is strictly positive. If γ =0 ,e a c hﬁrm has monopolistic
market power, while if γ =1 , the products are perfect substitutes.
8We assume that the only measure of quality in a vertical sense that is diﬀerent between
the two types of the product is θ.
8terms of individual damages and they diﬀerentiate between them based on
γ alone. The total consumers’ population is normalized to unity.
Maximization of (1) subject to the budget constraint yields the per pe-
riod t demand function for each type of the product,
qj(pj,p k;γ,θ),( 2 )
where j,k = c,d,a n dj 6= k. The total demand for the clean and the dirty
type is Qd(pj,p k;γ,θ,μ)=μqdi +( 1− μ)qdn and Qc(pj,p k;γ,θ,μ)=μqci +
(1−μ)qcn respectively, where qdi and qdn (qci and qcn) are the quantities of the
dirty (clean) good consumed by the informed and the uninformed consumer,
respectively. That is, qji ≡ qj(pj,p k;γ,θ) and qjn ≡ qj(pj,p k;γ,0),w h e r e
j = c,d.
At each time period t, the product is oﬀered by two ﬁrms, each oﬀering
only one product type. The ﬁrms compete in prices in the market. We
assume for simplicity that they are endowed with identical and constant
over time, production cost functions C(Q),w i t hCQ > 0 and CQQ ≥ 0.9
In the absence of any regulatory intervention, at any time period t, ﬁrm
j’s proﬁt maximization problem is
max
pj
πj (pj,p k;z)=pjQj(pj,p k;γ,θ,μ) − C(Qj(pj,p k;γ,θ,μ)) , (3)
where z is a vector of demand and cost parameters that includes γ, θ and
μ,a n d j = c,d, j 6= k. Assuming that each duopolist’s proﬁt function is
strictly concave on its own price and that there is an interior solution to the
maximization problem for all parameter values, the ﬁrst order condition of
(3) yields duopolist j’s reaction function, pj = Rj(pk;z), j 6= k. Assuming
further that
∂2πj
∂pj∂pk > 0, the slope of the reaction function is positive,
∂Rj
∂pk >
0, thus making duopolists’ prices strategic complements. Assuming ﬁnally
that
∂Rj
∂pk < 1, the two ﬁrms’ reaction functions yield the Nash equilibrium
prices, pj (z), j = c,d. Clearly in this case, equilibrium prices, quantities
of both product types, ﬁrms’ proﬁts, external damages and social welfare
remain unchanged over time.
9One could assume instead that the two ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of ﬁxed costs, with the
dirty good being cheaper than the clean good in terms of ﬁxed production costs. This
however would not qualitatively alter our results.
93.1 Policy options
In the absence of any regulatory intervention, we have two distortions related
to the characteristics of the dirty good. Firstly, an information asymmetry,
since only a fraction of the consumers has the required information to take
into account individual damages. Secondly, a negative externality on the en-
vironment that cannot be eliminated even when all consumers are informed.
Assuming that the government is unable to intervene separately in order to
correct the additional distortion arising from imperfect market competition,
this distortion must also be taken into account by a welfare maximizing reg-
ulator. In what follows, we examine the case in which the regulator uses a
c o m b i n a t i o no fat a xo nt h ed i r t yg o o da n di n f o r m a t i o np r o v i s i o n .
We model information provision as follows. The regulator provides a
level of information a(t) at each time period t. The cost of providing infor-
mation to consumers, K(a),w i t hK (0) = 0, is assumed to be increasing,
Ka > 0, at an increasing rate, Kaa > 0.10 The provision of information in-
creases the fraction of consumers that behave as informed consumers. How-
ever, it is not the level of currently provided information that aﬀects the
fraction of informed consumers but rather the stock of information accumu-
lated at time t. We denote the stock of information at time t by A(t),w h i c h
summarizes current and past information provision eﬀorts. It is reasonable
to assume that information provided in the past is less eﬀective than cur-
rently provided information. That is, while information provision directly
aﬀects uninformed consumers, some of the currently informed consumers
tend to forget and behave as uninformed.11 We model the latter by treating
information provision as a capital good,
˙ A = a − δA ,( 4 )
10Grossman and Shapiro (1984) use an advertisement cost function with the same prop-
erties in a model of product diﬀerentiation. To support the Kαα assumption, they argue
that "..it becomes increasingly expensive to reach higher fractions of the population, either
because preferred media become saturated, or because the target population is heteroge-
neous along a second dimension, namely, the tendency to view ads" (p. 66).
11We assume that this decay in the number of informed consumers does not apply to
the initial fraction of consumers that behavea si n f o r m e d .T h e s ec o n s u m e r sh a v ea c q u i r e d
their information through diﬀerent channels and their behavior is not aﬀected by the
government’s information provision policy. Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) make the same
assumption.
10assuming a constant rate of depreciation 0 <δ<1.12
When the stock of information accumulated at time t is A(t),t h e na
fraction φ(A(t)) of the uninformed consumers become informed. The fol-
lowing properties for the informed consumers generating function (ICGF)
φ(A) are assumed:
φ(A):R+ → [0,1],φ (0) = 0,φ
¡ ¯ A
¢
=1 , ¯ A ≤∞ ,( 5 )
φA (A) ≥ 0 for all A ≥ 0, lim
A→ ¯ A
φA (A)=0 ,( 6 )
∃A : φAA ≥ 0 for A ∈ [0,A] and φAA < 0 for A ∈ (A, ¯ A) .( 7 )
These assumptions imply that an increase in the stock of accumulated
information will never turn informed consumers to uninformed. Moreover,
that zero information stock could not generate informed consumers, while
there may exist a ﬁnite level of accumulated information stock at which all
consumers become informed. Further, the ICGF does not exhibit dimin-
ishing returns for all A. In fact, the ICGF shares common characteristics
with the sales response function to advertising which is commonly used in
the advertisement literature, to which we resort in order to characterize its
shape. The view that advertisement exhibits some degree of economies of
scale is widely acceptable by both theoreticians and practitioners and an
S-shaped response to advertisement function has been used extensively in
the literature (see for example Feinberg (2001)).13 The S-shaped response
function implies increasing marginal returns to advertising for low advertis-
ing levels followed, after an inﬂection point, by decreasing marginal returns.
Despite the continuing debate on the shape of the advertising response func-
tion,14 we adopt the view that consumers’ response to the current stock of
accumulated information is S-shaped with A denoting the point of inﬂection.
12The classic paper by Nerlove and Arrow (1962) introduced the following model of the
dynamic eﬀects of advertising: ˙ A = a − δA,w h e r eA is the level of "goodwill" at time t,
which aﬀects consumers demand, a is the level of advertising (in monetary terms) at time
t and δ is the depreciation rate of "goodwill". This model has been used extensively in
the advertisement literature.
13It should be noted however, that there are some empirical studies showing little or
no evidence of substantial returns to scale in advertisement (see for example Arndt and
Simon (1983) and Seldon, Jewell and O’Brien (2000)).
14See for example Cannon, Leckenby, and Abernethy (2002) and Dube, Hitsch and
Manchanda (2005).
11Taking into account the impact of information provision, the fraction of
the informed consumers m(t) at each point in time is
m(t)=μ +( 1− μ)φ(A(t)) ,
where μ is the initial fraction of informed consumers, 0 ≤ μ<1.
Within this policy framework, that is, a tax on the dirty good, τ(t),
and information provision a(t) (which contributes to the formation of the
information stock A(t)), the two ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problems at each
time period t are15
max
pc
πc (pc,p d;τ,φ(A),z)=pcQc(•) − C(Qc(•)) ,
max
pd
πd (pc,p d;τ,φ(A),z)=( pd − τ)Qd(•) − C(Qd(•)).
Making a similar set of assumptions on the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions as above,
we can obtain the duopolists’ reaction functions and then the equilibrium
prices at each time period t,
pj (τ,φ(A),z),j= c,d. (8)
The ﬁrms’ strategic variables are now functions of the two policy instru-
ments, τ(t) and a(t), in addition to cost and demand parameters presented
by the z vector.
4 Optimal policy mix
Substituting pc (τ,φ(A),z) and pd (τ,φ(A),z) from (8) into the demand
functions given in (2), yields qji(τ,φ(A),z) and qjn(τ,φ(A),z),f r o mw h i c h
we obtain Qj(τ,φ(A),z), j = c,d. Further, substituting these expressions
into the representative consumer’s utility function (1) yields the (gross) util-
ity of the informed Vi(τ,φ(A),z), and the uninformed Vn(τ,φ(A),z) con-
sumer, both evaluated at the true value of θ. This means that, in deriving
the optimal policy instrument levels, the regulator considers the true cost of
the dirty type of product and thus, it uses the true value of the uninformed
consumer’s utility, even though the consumer does not take into account
individual damages when making her choices.
15For notational simplicity we drop the time variable t.
12At each time period t, social welfare is the sum of the consumer and
producer surplus minus the external damages,
v(τ,φ(A),z)=mVi +( 1− m)Vn − C(Qc) − C(Qd) − D(Qd),
Thus, the regulator’s problem is to choose the optimal time paths for the





e−ρt [v(φ(A),τ,z) − K(a)]dt (9)
subject to:
˙ A = a − δA, A(0) = A0 ≥ 0 ,
(a(t),τ(t)) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0 ,
where ρ i st h ed i s c o u n tr a t ea n dK(a) the cost of advertisement. This is a
formal optimal control problem with current value Hamiltonian function
H = v(φ(A),τ,z) − K(a)+λ(a − δA), (10)
where λ is the costate variable reﬂecting the shadow price of the stock of
accumulated information. The necessary conditions for the choice of the
optimal policy instruments a and τ yield
∂H
∂a
≤ 0,a 0 > 0 ⇒ Ka
¡
a0¢


























˙ λ = ρλ −
∂H
∂A




We assume, without loss of generality, that the cost of advertisement is
quadratic, or K(a)=1
2ωa2 so that Kaa (a)=ω. Restricting attention to
interior solutions and using (11) and the fact that ω˙ a = ˙ λ to eliminate λ
13and ˙ λ from (15), the dynamic state-control system associated with problem
(9) can be written in the control-state space (a,A) as16




˙ A = a − δA, A(0) = A0 ≥ 0 , (17)
where DAv ≡
dv(φ(A),τ(A),z)
dA = vφφA + vττA denotes the rate of change of
social welfare with respect to the stock of information provision along a path
where the controls a and τ are chosen optimally for every A according to
(11) and (13) and vφ =
∂v(φ(A),τ(A),z)
∂φ . Since we are choosing the controls
optimally, vτ =0according to (13) and DAv = vφφA.
A steady state in the stock A and the ﬂow a of information provision is
deﬁned as (A∗,a ∗): ˙ A =0 , ˙ a =0 . As it will be proven later, multiple steady
states exist for our problem. To study the properties of these steady states
for solutions A∗ ∈ [0, ¯ A], we make some additional assumptions regarding
the structure of the social welfare functional v(φ(A),τ(A),z) which deﬁnes,
for given parameters z, a map from the vector space containing φ and τ to
the real numbers when a and τ are chosen optimally.
Assumption A1 : vφ ≥ 0, vττ < 0, vτφ < 0, with all derivatives bounded,
and φA (0) = 0.
Assumption A1 implies that an increase in the fraction of the informed
consumers does not reduce social welfare. Furthermore, the rate of change
in social welfare due to an increase in the tax level is decreasing in both
τ and φ. The last part of the assumption means that an increase in the
stock of the information provision will not increase the fraction of informed
consumers when this stock is negligible.
Assumption A2 : For σ (A)=vφφ (φA)
2 + vφφAA, (i) σ (0) > 0, (ii)









16The dynamic system associated with problem (9) can be equivalently analyzed in the
state-costate space (λ,A). Results carry over from one space to the other since control
and state are related by the optimality condition a
0 = a(λ).
17This assumption is required for the existence of a steady state. It also simpliﬁes the
analysis by excluding the possibility of more than three steady states. The satisfaction











> 0. Assumption A2(iii) can be dispensed in a more general model.
It is veriﬁed that all our assumptions are satisﬁed in our linear demand example, see
equations (24), and the numerical simulations in Section 6.
14The structure of the steady states is described in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions A1 and A2 and an S-shaped ICGF,
there exist at most two positive steady states, 0 <A ∗
1 <A ∗
2 < ∞. When
only one positive steady state exists then it is a saddle point. When two pos-
itive steady states exist then the larger is a saddle point while the smaller is
unstable. The origin is a steady state, which is a saddle point if two positive
steady states exist and unstable if only one positive steady state exists. For
as u ﬃciently large depreciation rate δ there is no positive steady state and
the origin is the only nonnegative steady state.
Proof. A steady state occurs at the intersection of the isocline ψa ≡
ψa (A)|˙ a=0 =
vφφA
(ρ+δ)ω, deﬁned through 0=( ρ + δ)a− 1
ωDAv,w i t ht h ei s o c l i n e
ψA ≡ ψA (A)
¯ ¯




= δA or ψa = ψA .








2 + vφφAA .
Assumptions A1 and A2, along with the assumptions about the S-shaped
ICGF and continuity, imply that, ψa starts at the origin, has an increasing
part, reaches a maximum for A = ˆ A>0, and then declines converging
to zero as A becomes large. We do not make any assumptions regarding
the sign of vφφ. If it is positive, then σ(A) is deﬁnitely positive up to the
inﬂection point of the φ function, i.e. for A ∈ [0,A],a n dt h e na sA increases
further and φAA becomes negative, σ(A) decreases and eventually becomes
negative. If vφφ is negative, then σ(A) is positive for a range of values of
A for which vφφAA >
¯ ¯ ¯vφφ (φA)
2
¯ ¯ ¯ and then as A increases further, σ(A)
becomes negative. In the linear demand case examined in Section 6, we
show that vφφ > 0.T h e i s o c l i n e ψA is a ray from the origin with positive
slope δ. If the slope of ψa at the origin is less than δ or ψa
A (0) <δ ,t h e n
ψA intersects ψa either one or three times in the positive quadrant as shown
in Figure 1.18 For really high levels of δ,t h e yo n l yi n t e r s e c ta tt h eo r i g i n .










































Figure 1: Multiple steady states
Otherwise they intersect three times, one at the origin and two at positive
values of A, points U and Q in Figure 1. If ψa
A (0) >δthen ψA intersects
ψa two times in the positive quadrant, one at the origin and another one at
positive values of A, which corresponds to point E in Figure 1. To study the
stability property of a steady state we consider the linearization of the state-
control system deﬁned by (16) and (17) at this steady state. The Jacobian
matrix of the state-control system is
J =
µ




= J (a∗,A ∗) . (18)




where det(J)=−δ (ρ + δ)+
σ(A∗)
ω , a steady state will be either unstable or it
16will have the local saddle point property. If det(J) < 0, then the eigenvalues











that is, the slope of the ψA curve should exceed the slope of ψa at the steady
state. Thus, a saddle point steady state occurs at the declining part of the ψa
curve, or more generally when ψA intersects ψa from below. If det(J) > 0
then the steady state is unstable. The unstable steady state occurs at the
increasing part of the ψa curve where the slope of ψa is larger than δ, or
more generally when ψA intersects ψa from above. If ρ2 < 4det(J (A∗))
at the unstable steady state, then the eigenvalues at A∗ are complex with
positive real parts and the trajectories curl away from the unstable steady
state as shown in Figure 2, where the phase diagram suggests that A∗
1 is a
local unstable focus. Finally, for suﬃciently high δ, isoclines ψA and ψa do
not intersect at the positive quadrant and the only nonnegative steady state
is the origin. Since in this case ψA intersects ψa from below, the origin is a
saddle point.
It can be easily shown following the steps of the proof that if φA (0) > 0,
which means that an increase in the stock of information provision will in-
crease the fraction of informed consumers even when this stock is negligible,
then there is the possibility of three positive steady states.19 In terms of Fig-
ure 1 the assumption φA (0) > 0 means that the ψa isocline shifts upwards,
like the dashed line, so that it has a positive intercept. In this case there
could either be three steady states, the middle one being unstable and the
other two being local saddle points, or a unique saddle point steady state.
In the latter case, the unique steady state will be high for low δ and low for
high δ.
We turn now back to the case φA (0) = 0. Steady states are shown in
Figure 1 along the solid isocline ψa (A)|˙ a=0.F o rl o wδ there exists a unique
positive steady state at A∗
M with the saddle point property, while the origin is
19We use the assumption φA (0) = 0 in the main proof in order to have compatibility
with our numerical results presented in the Section 6, where the ICFG function satisﬁes
this assumption.
17an unstable focus. Convergence to A∗
M takes place along the stable manifold
MM.For any initial value of the information stock A, there exists an initial
value of the ﬂow of information provision a such that there is convergence
to the optimal steady state on the one-dimensional manifold MEM.F o r
example, if the initial stock of information is A0, the converging path is
along ME. As δ increases the steady state information stock is reduced.20
T h e r ee x i s t sar a n g eo fδ such that three steady states could exist, the
origin and (A∗
1,A ∗
2) > 0. The origin and steady state A∗
2 are local saddle
points, while A∗
1 is unstable. It should be noted that in order to have three
steady states, it is necessary that, apart from a suﬃciently high δ, the ψa
c u r v eb ec o n v e x - c o n c a v et ot h el e f to fi t sm a x i m u m .I fψa is concave until
its maximum then only one positive steady state exists. For even higher δ
there is no positive steady state. The origin is the only nonnegative steady
state which is a local saddle point. Thus, when δ increases, the slope of
the ψA curve increases, while the ψa curve shifts downward.21 Therefore,
as might have been expected, the higher the depreciation of the stock of
knowledge, the lower, ceteris paribus, the steady state stock of information
provision. The rate of change of marginal advertising costs ω has a similar
eﬀect on the steady state stock of information provision. The higher this
rate is, the further ψa shifts downward and the more the steady state A is
reduced.
Although a full analysis of the dynamics of the state-control system (16)-
(17) is beyond the purpose of this paper, there are some interesting insights
related to the ranking between multiple steady states. The parameters δ
and ω act as bifurcation parameters in the sense that as these parameters
are varied, the qualitative behavior of the state-control system changes and
moves from a unique to multiple steady states. The existence of multiple
steady states indexed by i, with i =1 ,2,3 in our problem, implies that each
steady state can be thought as a local maximum of the value function W (A)
for the problem. The value function can be deﬁned using the Hamilton-
20This is because the slope of the isocline ψ





(ρ+δ)ω and neither vφ nor φA are functions of δ.



































Figure 2: The zero information provision trap
Jacobi equation as
ρW (A)=m a x
a H(A,λ(A),a) (19)
where λ(A) is the optimal stable manifold in the state-costate space, while
α(A) will be the corresponding optimal manifold in the contol-state space
(e.g. HQ in Figure 2). Consider any locally optimal trajectory {λi (A),
ai (A)} and associate with it a candidate value function wi (A)=1
ρH(A,λi (A),a i (A)).
The globally optimal steady state i which is reachable from the state A
will be the one that corresponds to the maxi wi (A) for all i, or i(A)=
argmaxwi (A). In our problem it is interesting to examine whether, in the
case of the three steady states of Figure 2, the globally optimal steady state
is attained at A∗
2 or at the origin, and how this ranking depends on the
19initial state A.22 We proceed by excluding ﬁrst the possibility of a limit
cycle around the unstable steady state A∗
1. In the state-control space, the





























therefore by the Poincaré-Bendixon theorem a limit cycle does not exist
around the unstable steady state A∗
1.
Then we compare the candidate steady states by using the "Candi-
date value function comparison" (Brock and Starrett 2003, Proposition 5),23
which for our case can be stated as follows:
Index by i =0and i =2the candidate value functions, so w0 (A),w 2 (A)
are the two candidate value functions corresponding to the two local steady
states, the origin A∗
0 =0and A∗
2. Then if
[λ0 (A) − λ2 (A)]
dA0
dt
≥ 0 ⇒ w0 (A) ≤ w2 (A). (20)
This comparison allows us to study the existence of the so-called Skiba
point. Assume that for a given parametrization of problem (9) the structure
of the steady states is such that one branch of the unstable focus around
A∗
1 becomes the stable manifold for A∗
2, while a second branch becomes the
stable manifold for the origin as shown in Figure 2. Then it is clear that
for initial states to the right of A+ the manifold USQ that converges to
A∗
2 is optimal, while for initial states to the left of A− the manifold UR0
that converges to the origin is optimal. It follows then that there exists one
switch point in As ∈ [A−,A +] such that for initial states to the right of
As it is optimal to converge to A∗
2 along the stable manifold SQ,w h i l ef o r
initial states to the left of As it is optimal to converge to the origin along
t h es t a b l em a n i f o l dR0. The initial state As is a Skiba point.24 Thus, for a
range of parameter values for δ and ω, initial conditions matter and for a
22T h ea n a l y s i si se x a c t l yt h es a m ef o rt h ec a s ew h e r et h e“ l o wA” steady state is positive.
23For a similar result see Wagener (2003, Lemma 4).
24The existence of an unstable steady state between two saddle points does not however
implies the existence of a Skiba point. As has shown by Wagener (2003) if the dynamic
state-control system has a local cusp bifurcation for ρ =0then a Skiba point exists for
small but positive ρ. Identiﬁcation of the Skiba point relies heavily on numerical analysis
(e.g. Wagener 2003, Mäler et al. 2003).
20certain range of values of the initial stock of advertisement the system can be
trapped into a zero (or low if φA (0) > 0) steady state stock of information
provision. In this case it is optimal to provide very little or no information
at all and to rely heavily on taxation for the control of personal and external
damages.
Alternatively, there could be steady state structures with stable mani-
folds pairs like (HQJ, UR0) and (G0,U S Q ) converging respectively to the
origin, or A∗
2, where only one branch emanates from the unstable steady
state and becomes a stable manifold. Given an initial state, condition (20)
can be used to determine the globally optimal steady state. For example, if
the structure corresponds to the pair (HQJ, UR0) and the initial state is
A0 <A − ( F i g u r e2 )w eh a v eλ0 (A0) <λ 2 (A0) and dA0
dt < 025 then by (20)
w0 (A) ≤ w2 (A) and the globally optimal path is the one leading to A∗
2.
Under an alternative structure the globally optimal path could be the one
leading to zero information provision.
The possibility of a trap with zero information provision is policy rele-
vant, since in most cases information provision policies are absent, and thus
a realistic initial value for A is zero. In this case if information depreciation
δ and the marginal cost of providing information ω are suﬃciently low, then
the optimal policy will be to follow a path like 0E in Figure 1 and converge
to a steady state with positive information provision. If however δ and ω are
suﬃciently high, it might be optimal not to start any information provision
policy and to have the system remain at the initial state A =0 . If some pos-
itive stock for A exists at the initial state because of previous policies,26 but
the system has two positive steady states as in Figure 2, then if the initial
stock is below As it is optimal to let the existing stock fully depreciate. It
m i g h tb ep o s s i b l et h a tad e c r e a s ei nδ and/or ω might change that structure
of the steady states of the system so that the initial state is now to the right
of the Skiba point. In this case the system would be out of the trap so that
25Taking the vertical from A
0 below A− up to the points where it intersects UR0 and






0) but λ = λ(a) from the maximization of the Hamiltonian
and dλ/da > 0, therefore λ0 (A
0) <λ 2 (A
0). Furthermore dA0/dt < 0 since the path R0
is below ˙ A =0where ˙ A<0.
26Examples are the cases of antismoking campaigns and information regarding damages
related to PVCs, discussed in the introduction.
21it could reach the steady state A∗
2.
Having determined the optimal paths for information provision, the cor-
responding optimal path for the tax τ∗ (t) c a nb eo b t a i n e db ys o l v i n gt h e






The trade-oﬀ between the stock of information provision and taxation at
each point in time can be obtained by using the implicit function theorem






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
A=A∗(t)
,
which is negative, given φA > 0 and assumption A1 (that is, vττ < 0 and
vτφ < 0). As the information stock increases along the optimal path leading
to the steady state, the optimal tax rate decreases.
5 Analytical results using linear demand and cost
functions
In this section we resort to speciﬁc functional forms for the utility and cost
functions in order to obtain tractable results for the model developed above.
In order to incorporate both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation charac-
teristics, the utility of the representative informed consumer is27









where I is the numeraire good produced by a competitive sector. Thus,
utility is quadratic in the consumption of the clean and dirty type of the
product and linear in the consumption of other goods I. The parameter
γ ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of substitutability between the two types of
the product. We assume that the two types of the product are less than
perfect substitutes, that is, γ<γ k < 1,w h e r eγk is the critical value of the
27A similar type of utility function has been introduced by Dixit (1979) and used in many
works such as Singh and Vives (1984). For a comprehensive and complete presentation,
see Martin (2002).








Figure 3: The ICGF sigmoid function
degree of substitutability guaranteeing that both informed and uninformed
consumers purchase, in all cases under consideration, positive quantities of
both types of the product.
The consumer’s utility maximization problem yields the following de-
mand function for each type of product
qc =
α(1 − γ)+( 1+γ)θ − pc + γpd
1 − γ2 ; qd =
α(1 − γ) − (1 + γ)θ − pd + γpc
1 − γ2 .
As in the general case, the regulator, at each time period, imposes a
t a xo nt h ed i r t yg o o d ,τ(t), and provides information a(t).T h e s t o c k o f
information accumulated at time t is A(t), and thus a fraction φ(A(t)) of
the uninformed consumers becomes informed. For the ICGF we assume a




which is illustrated in Figure 3. This functional form satisﬁes all the prop-
erties we have assumed in the general model, equations (5) to (7) and has




(1+A2)2 > 0, ∀ A>0, φA(0) = 0 and φAA(A)=
2−6A2
(1+A2)3.
23The fraction of the informed consumers m(t) at each point of time is
m(t)=μ +( 1− μ)φ(A(t)). The total demand for the clean and the dirty
good is Qd = mqdi +( 1− m)qdn and Qc = mqci +( 1− m)qcn respectively,
where qdi and qdn (qci and qcn) are the quantities of the dirty (clean) good
consumed by the informed and the uninformed consumer, respectively. That
is, qji ≡ qj(θ) and qjn ≡ qj(θ =0 ) ,w h e r ej = c,d.
On the production side, we assume that the two ﬁrms produce with the
same constant marginal cost c.E a c hﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem, at
each time period t,i s
max
pc
πc =( pc − c)Qc ,
max
pd
πd =( pd − τ − c)Qd .
The reaction functions resulting from the duopolists’ proﬁt maximization
problems are solved for the prices, at each time period t,a sf u n c t i o n so ft h e
two policy instruments
pc =
B + m(2 − γ)(1 + γ)θ + γτ
4 − γ2 , pd =
B − m(2 − γ)(1 + γ)θ +2 τ
4 − γ2 , (23)
where B =( 2+γ)[(1− γ)α + c],j ,k= c,d and j 6= k.
Using similar steps as in the previous section, we obtain, at each time
period t, the total demand for the clean and the dirty type of the product
and, moreover, the informed and uninformed representative consumer’s gross
utilities, both evaluated at the true values of θ. To further simplify the
analysis we assume that the dirty product’s external damages are linear in
output, D(Qd)=dQd. The social welfare function given in (??)s a t i s ﬁes all




(1 − γ)Ω1 + θφ(A)
£
(5 − γ2)+Ω2/A2¤ª
(1 − γ)(4− 3γ2)
,
vφφ =
(1 + γ)(7− 6γ)(1− μ)
2 θ2





(1 − γ2)(4− γ2)
2 < 0, and vτφ = −
(1 − μ)θ
(1 − γ)(2+γ)
2 < 0, (24)
where Ω1 =( 1− γ)(a − c)+γd > 0 and Ω2 =2 ( 1− γ)[(1+γ) − 3μ]+
γ (1 − μ)−1. Ω2 is positive for all values of γ that ensure that both types of
24consumers purchase positive quantities of both types of the product. Since
Ω1 > 0 and Ω2 > 0,w eh a v et h a tvφ > 0.
6 Numerical simulations
In order to illustrate the optimal time paths of the tax τ(t) and informa-
tion provision a(t) that solve the maximization problem stated in Section
4, we resort to numerical simulations. W eu s et h ef o l l o w i n gv a l u e sf o rt h e
model’s parameters: a =8 0 , θ =1 5 , γ =0 .4, μ =0 .3, c =1 0 , ρ =0 .03,
δ =0 .05, ω =5 0 0and d =1 2 . From the solution of the dynamic state-
control system, equations (16) and (17), for A and a,w ed e ﬁne the isoclines
ψa (A)|˙ a=0 and ψA (A)
¯ ¯
˙ A=0 w h i c ha r ep r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e4 .f o rt h ev a l u e s
of the parameters we use, and given that φA (0) = 0 for the ICGF assumed
in (22), the two isoclines intersect at the origin and at one more point in the
positive quadrant. The coordinates (A,a) of the second intersection, which
corresponds to point E in Figure 4, are (4.49296,0.224648). Since only one
positive steady state exists, it is expected by Proposition 1, that the origin
is unstable while the positive steady state is the only saddle point. The
simulations conﬁrm this result since the eigenvalues corresponding to point
E are real (0.13829, −0.10829) while those corresponding to the origin are
complex (0.015 + 0.714168i, 0.015 − 0.714168i). Therefore, in our example,
the optimal positive steady state with the local saddle point property corre-
sponds to a stock of advertisement A∗ =4 .49296 and a ﬂow of advertisement
a∗ =0 .224648. At the optimal steady state a fraction φ(A∗)=0 .952801 of
uninformed consumers becomes informed and the total fraction of informed
consumers is m = μ +( 1− μ)φ(A∗)=0 .96696.
As in the general case, convergence to the optimal steady state occurs on
the manifold MEM. Starting in the neighborhood of E from any level of the
stock of information away from the optimal, the government can determine
the path of the ﬂow of information a∗ (t) leading to the optimal steady state
(A∗,a ∗).
Figure 5 depicts the tax τ as a function of the stock of information
A, derived from the optimality condition (13). The curve depicting the
optimal tax response has a horizontally inverted S-shape, that is, there is a
























Figure 4: Steady states in the linear example
fast decrease in the tax rate for low values of A and a slower decrease for
higher levels of A. This is exactly what we expected from the general model,
where we found that there exists a trade-oﬀ between the stock of information








Given that φA(A) > 0 and the values of vττ and vτφ presented in (24), it
is clear that the slope of the curve is negative. Furthermore, since
vτφ
vττ does
not depend on A, the slope of the curve will follow the slope of the IGGF,
φA(A).
When the stock of advertisement is zero, the tax rate is high, τ (0) =
14.9236, since taxation attempts to correct both the negative environmental
externality and the information asymmetry, while taking into account the
imperfections in the market. As the stock of information builds up, the
required tax rate decreases, approaching its lowest value as the stock of
advertisement approaches its optimal steady state value A∗, τ (A∗)=4 .737.
It should be noted that the optimal steady state value of the tax, τ (A∗),i s
very close to the optimal tax in the absence of information asymmetry, that
is when μ =1 . In such a case, the optimal tax level that takes into account
















Figure 5: Tax response to changes in the stock of information
personal damages and the externality is τ =4 .23273. The fact that this tax
level is far below external and personal damages is due to the presence of
imperfect competition in the market.
The numerical results of the linear demand model conﬁrm the results of
the general model. There exists one, under the assumptions of our model,
optimal steady state with the saddle point property. As we approach the
optimal steady state, increasing the stock of information, the optimal tax
level decreases.
Some points regarding the behavior of the informed and uninformed con-
sumers as government’s policies are converging to the optimal steady state
are worth making. As the stock of information builds up, the market de-
mand for the clean (dirty) product type increases (decreases) and as a result
its price increases (decreases). Responding to the change in prices, the un-
informed as well as the informed consumers decrease their consumption of
the clean product type and increase the consumption of the dirty product
type at the individual level. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the change in the
informed and uninformed consumer’s demand for the clean and the dirty
product type as the stock of information increases. The change in the ag-




















Figure 6: Optimal demands for the clean product type as functions of the
stock of information A(t).
gregate demand for the two types of product is also shown in the graphs.
In Figure 6 (7), Qc(A) (Qd(A)) increases (decreases) as the stock of infor-
mation moves towards A∗,c o n v e r g i n gt oqci(A) (qdi(A)) since the fraction
of informed consumers approaches unity. The individual consumer’s shift
towards the dirty product type depends on the degree of substitutability
between the two goods.
The market demand for the clean (dirty) product type increases (de-
creases) despite the shift towards the dirty good at the individual level,
because the fraction of informed consumers increases and their consumption
of the clean product type is much higher than the demand of the uninformed
consumers as Figure 6 shows. Given that environmental damages are de-
creasing as aggregate consumption of the dirty good decreases, the optimal
mix of policies leads to the decrease in environmental damages.
Both types of consumers are substituting towards the dirty good as the
government’s policy develops, in order to maximize their own utility. Social
welfare is increasing, as shown in Figure 8, since the utility of both types of
consumers increases and environmental damages are decreasing.
In closing, a note on how the parameters of the model aﬀect the steady
state is in order. First, as the fraction μ of informed consumers before the




















Figure 7: Optimal demands for the dirty product type as functions of the
stock of information A(t).









Figure 8: Optimal social welfare as a function of the stock of information
A(t).
29policy intervention increases, the ψa isocline shifts downwards and the stock
of advertisement at the steady state A∗ decreases. The higher is the fraction
of informed consumers in the absence of policy, the less aggressive is the op-
timal information campaign. Second, the higher are the personal damages,
θ,t h em o r et h eψa isocline shifts upwards and the stock of advertisement
at the steady state A∗ increases. Finally, the closer substitutes the two
types of the product are, the ψa isocline shifts upwards and the stock of
advertisement at the steady state A∗ increases.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
It is beyond any dispute that the public, either as consumers, workers or
investors, can play an important role in shifting production towards more
healthy and environmentally safe products and processes if they have in-
formation about health and environmental risks. However, these risks are
rarely common knowledge, and private ﬁrms that possess this information
are unlikely to share it with the public voluntarily. Thus, the government has
an incentive to provide reliable information in order to complement existing
policies. The present paper examines the case of products that are responsi-
ble for both environmental and long term health damages. Given that con-
sumers have incomplete information about health and environmental risks,
we examine the role of information provision in supporting environmental
taxation. We ﬁnd that the combination of the two policy instruments is
eﬃcient since information provision results in lowering aggregate consump-
tion of the good generating health and environmental damages and thus it
reduces the need for environmental taxation. Over time the optimal tax rate
declines resulting in lower costs, while the beneﬁts are increasing.
Although in the present paper we do not introduce environmental dam-
ages in individuals’ utility, a natural extension would be to examine cases
in which consumers are willing to internalize part of the external damages
they generate. In such cases, the government could provide the appropriate
information in order to convince the public to, at least partially, internalize
the environmental cost.
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